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Abstract 
This paper introduces heterogeneous beliefs among households in a small open economy model 
for the Canadian economy. The model suggests that simultaneous boom-bust cycles in house 
prices, output, investment, consumption and hours worked emerge when credit-constrained 
mortgage borrowers expect that future house prices will rise and this expectation is neither 
shared by savers nor realized ex-post. With sticky prices and a standard monetary policy rule, the 
model shows that the nominal policy interest rate and the CPI inflation rate decline during 
housing booms and rise as house prices fall. These results replicate the stylized features of 
housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries. Policy experiments demonstrate 
that stronger policy responses to inflation amplify housing-market boom-bust cycles. Also, 
higher loan-to-value ratios amplify housing-market boom-bust cycles by encouraging speculative 
housing investments by mortgage borrowers during housing booms and increasing liquidation of 
housing collateral during housing busts. 
JEL classification: E44, E52 
Bank classification: Credit and credit aggregates; Financial stability; Inflation targets 
Résumé 
L’auteur présente un modèle de petite économie ouverte pour le Canada dans lequel les 
croyances des ménages sont hétérogènes. Selon le modèle, des cycles simultanés d’envolée et 
d’effondrement des prix de l’immobilier résidentiel, de la production, de l’investissement, de la 
consommation et du nombre d’heures travaillées pourraient émerger si les emprunteurs 
hypothécaires ayant un accès limité au crédit s’attendent à une hausse des prix des maisons mais 
que ces attentes ne sont pas partagées par les épargnants et sont déçues par la suite. Le modèle 
montre qu’en présence de prix rigides et d’une règle standard de politique monétaire, le taux 
d’intérêt directeur nominal et le taux d’augmentation de l’indice des prix à la consommation 
diminuent durant un boom immobilier et augmentent lorsque les prix des maisons tombent. Ces 
résultats cadrent avec les grands traits des cycles d’essor et de contraction du marché du 
logement dans les pays industrialisés. D’après les simulations réalisées, une réaction plus 
vigoureuse de la politique monétaire face à l’inflation amplifie ces cycles. Un rapport prêt-valeur 
élevé les accentue aussi en incitant les emprunteurs hypothécaires à effectuer des investissements 
spéculatifs sur le marché du logement pendant le boom, de sorte que, quand elle se produit, la 
chute des prix des maisons entraîne une hausse des liquidations de garanties immobilières. 
Classification JEL : E44, E52 
Classification de la Banque : Crédit et agrégats du crédit; Stabilité financière; Cibles en matière 
d’inflation 1 Introduction
Signi¯cant declines in asset prices tend to follow strong booms in asset markets. The conduct of monetary
policy during such boom-bust cycles has been a matter of policy debates. In earlier literature, Bernanke
and Gertler (1999) argue that anti-in°ationary monetary policy stabilizes output and in°ation during asset-
market boom-bust cycles, using a model in which boom-bust cycles are generated by exogenous deviations
of the market price of capital from the `fundamental' price of capital that would be implied by competitive
equilibrium.1 Also, Basant Roi and Mendes (2007) consider a similar type of exogenous boom-bust cycle
in the housing market in a small open economy model for the Canadian economy. But without completely
endogenizing the market prices of assets, these models do not fully take into account feedback from the
conduct of monetary policy to asset prices. To analyze the e®ect of monetary policy during housing-market
boom-bust cycles, this paper uses an alternative model in which housing-market boom-bust cycles emerge
endogenously.
This paper considers a small open economy model for the Canadian economy. The model incorporates
two types of households who respectively take and provide mortgage loans (i.e., borrowers and savers) as
well as credit constraints such that households can borrow only up to the collateral value of their housing.2
As the cause of housing-market boom-bust cycles, the model incorporates over-optimistic household expec-
tations caused by noisy public signals of future fundamentals that are not realized ex-post. This approach
follows the so-called \news shock" models.3 While the previous literature assumes that households hold
identical interpretations of public signals, this paper relaxes this assumption, allowing households to hold
heterogeneous prior beliefs on the accuracy of public signals. This assumption lets the model incorporate the
existence of heterogeneity in household expectations, which is well-established in empirical work using house-
hold survey data.4 Also, the assumption of heterogeneous beliefs regarding the accuracy of public signals
1Using a similar model, Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2003) disagree with Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
2Except for heterogeneous beliefs, the features of the model follow Iacoviello (2005).
3For example, see Beaudry and Portier (2004), Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2006), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006), Floden
(2007), Kobayashi, Nakajima and Inaba (2007), and Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2007).
4For example, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004) document that disagreement in in°ation expectations both among consumers
2is a common feature among behavioural-¯nance models that analyze the joint behaviour of overpricing and
trading volume in the stock market.5 In this regard, this paper adds to the behavioural-¯nance literature
by considering the e®ects of heterogeneous beliefs on house prices.
The model in this paper shows that if credit-constrained borrowers expect that future house prices will
rise and this expectation is not shared by savers or realized ex-post, then the equilibrium dynamics of the
model replicate the stylized pattern of housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries, that is,
house prices, output, consumption, investment and hours worked have tended to co-move during housing-
market boom-bust cycles, while the nominal policy interest rate and the CPI in°ation rate have tended
to fall during housing booms and rise as house prices fell. The model explains these features of housing-
market boom-bust cycles as follows: When borrowers expect that future house prices will rise, they increase
housing investments, which causes a housing boom. Since borrowers are credit-constrained, they work more
to ¯nance their housing investments during the boom. At the same time, when savers do not share the
optimistic expectations of borrowers, they instead expect the boom to be temporary and increase savings for
a future recession. The increases in labour supply and savings reduce real wages and the real interest rate,
respectively. Given sticky prices, a resulting fall in the marginal cost of production lowers the in°ation rate,
and, in response to this, the central bank cuts the policy rate. When the optimistic expectations of borrowers
are not realized ex-post, however, a housing bust occurs. In response, savings and labour supply decline.
As a consequence, the in°ation rate rises, inducing a monetary policy tightening. Policy experiments in the
model demonstrate that greater anti-in°ationary weight in the monetary policy rule ampli¯es boom-bust
cycles in housing markets, since it enhances the counter-cyclical movements in the nominal policy interest
rate during housing-market boom-bust cycles.
The model assumes that credit-constrained borrowers have higher elasticity of labour supply than savers.
and professional economists varies through time.
5Investors are assumed to hold heterogeneous beliefs on the accuracy of public signals of the future fundamental value of
stocks. When a public signal is observed, optimistic investors buy shares from pessimistic investors. Thus, the upward dynamics
of asset prices is generated by the beliefs of the optimistic investors, and the overpricing is accompanied by the °ow of trade
from the pessimistic investors to the optimistic investors. See Hong and Stein (2007) for a recent survey of the literature.
3This assumption is motivated by two observations in data: mortgage borrowers tend to be young, while
old households own a large fraction of ¯nancial assets in the economy; and young households show higher
volatility of hours worked than old households.6 In this regard, heterogeneous expectations between bor-
rowers and savers in the model are related to heterogeneous expectations between di®erent age groups. In
fact, given this interpretation, the result of the model that housing booms occur when borrowers become
more optimistic than savers is consistent with the observation that the real house price growth rate has been
positively correlated with the di®erence of household expectations of young households from those of old
households. Also, the main role played by labour supply in the model is consistent with the pro-cyclicality of
total hours worked during housing boom-bust episodes in industrialized countries as well as the observation
that the hours worked of young households have been more strongly correlated with real house prices than
the hours worked of old households have.
In the related literature, Piazzesi and Schneider (2008) quantify the e®ect of heterogeneous expectations
between di®erent age groups on household portfolio choice and asset prices by imposing household expectation
survey data on an overlapping generations model. While the direct use of survey data is one of the strengths
of their analysis, they must take household expectations as exogenous in the model. In this paper, household
expectations are endogenous to parameters in the model. This feature of the model ensures that policy
experiments take into account the responses of household expectations to policy changes.
Also, the model in this paper suggests that higher loan-to-value ratios amplify housing-market boom-bust
cycles by encouraging speculative housing investments by credit-constrained borrowers. This result contrasts
with preceding dynamic equilibrium models with credit-constrained borrowers considered by Iacoviello (2005)
and Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2007), which ¯nd that the loan-to-value ratio does not signi¯cantly
alter aggregate house-price dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the cross-country evidence on
the stylized features of housing-market boom-bust cycles in Canada and other industrialized countries and
6See Meh and Terajima (2008) for detailed analysis of wealth distribution among Canadian households. See Section 4 in
this paper for more details on the volatility of hours worked.
4suggestive evidence for the e®ect of heterogeneous beliefs on house prices in Canadian and U.S. data. Section
3 describes the model. Section 4 explains the solution method and parameter speci¯cation. Section 5 presents
the main results. Section 6 conducts policy experiments and sensitivity analysis. Section 7 investigates the
e®ects of public signals of future shocks to monetary policy, the real world interest rate and export demand.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Stylized features of housing-market boom-bust cycles
2.1 Cross-country evidence
Ahearne, et al. (2005) document the median dynamics of macroeconomic indicators around the peaks of
housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries from 1973 to 2000. They ¯nd that output,
consumption and investment have tended to positively co-move with real house prices during boom-bust
cycles, while the nominal policy interest rate and the CPI in°ation rate have tended to decline during
housing booms and rise as house prices fell. Also, Ahearne, et al. ¯nd that the stylized relationship between
house prices and the nominal policy interest rate is broadly similar between the pre-1985 and the post-1985
sub-sample periods.
Figure 1 reproduces the charts 3.1-3 reported by Ahearne, et al. for the real GDP growth rate, the CPI
in°ation rate, and the nominal policy interest rate over the entire sample period, 1973-2000, following their
data appendix. The panels in the ¯gure are not completely identical with their charts, since for the nominal
policy interest rate and the CPI in°ation rate, I take the medians of the changes in the variables from 5 years
before the peaks of housing booms, while Ahearne, et al. show the medians of the levels of these variables,
which are not stationary over time. Also, for the CPI in°ation rate, Ahearne, et al. use the rates targeted
by central banks if exist, while I use total CPI in°ation rates. See data appendix in this paper for more
details on the methodology.
Adding to the ¯nding of Ahearne, et al., I conduct a similar exercise for total hours worked in Figure
1. The panel shows the hours worked index constructed from the medians of hours worked growth rates. It
5indicates that total hours worked have tended to grow strongly during housing booms and decline signi¯cantly
during housing busts.
Figure 2 extracts the episodes of housing-market boom-bust cycles in Canada from the cross-country
data. According to the de¯nition used by Ahearne, et al., Canada has experienced three house-price peaks
since the 1970s: in 1976, 1981 and 1989. The last two boom-bust episodes display the features commonly
shared among cross-country data. More speci¯cally, in the last two episodes, real house prices co-moved
with the output and hours worked. As in the cross-country evidence, the policy rate and the in°ation rate
showed noticeable increases around the house-price peaks.7
Figure 3 shows that the behaviour of the in°ation rate during the boom-bust episode around 1989 depends
on the inclusion of shelter costs in the CPI. The in°ation rate of the total CPI, which includes shelter costs,
tended to be stationary during the housing boom. In contrast, the exclusion of shelter costs from the CPI
was associated with a decline in the in°ation rate during the housing boom. In Section 6.3, I will discuss
why the behaviour of the in°ation rate depends on the exclusion of shelter costs from the CPI.
2.2 Suggestive evidence for the e®ects of heterogeneous beliefs on house prices
The model in this paper will indicate that house prices would rise with over-optimism of credit-constrained
borrowers compared to savers and that the labour supply of credit-constrained borrowers would be pro-
cyclical during housing-market boom-bust cycles. In this section, I discuss suggestive evidence for these
results from data on the hours worked and the expectations of young and old households. I focus on di®erent
age groups, since credit-constrained borrowers who take mortgage loans tend to be young and savers who
provide mortgage loans through ¯nancial intermediaries tend to be old. This section describes two empirical
¯ndings: the hours worked of young households co-move with house prices more closely than those of old
households do; and the real house price growth rate positively responds to the di®erence of a household
7On the other hand, the dynamics around the house-price peak that occurred in 1976 did not clearly show the stylized
pattern identi¯ed by Ahearne, et al. This might be because the boom-bust cycle that took place in 1976 was immediately
followed by another boom-bust cycle. Thus, the dynamics during the bust period after 1976 were also in°uenced by economic
factors behind the housing boom that peaked in 1981.
6expectation index for the young from that for the old.
2.2.1 Positive correlations between house prices and hours worked of young households
Figure 4 compares the real house price index and the hours worked of young and old households in Canada. It
shows that the average hours worked of young households (less than 45 years old) rose and fell with housing
booms and busts, respectively, around 1980 and 1990, while the average hours worked of old households
(45-65 years old, and 45 years old and over) did not show such a clear correlation with house prices in those
periods. Note that the average hours worked in the ¯gure are hours worked per population per week for each
age group, which include both intensive and extensive margins. Correlations between house prices and hours
worked reported in Table 1 con¯rm the implications of Figure 4. In Table 1, since the U-shape development of
the hours worked of old households may re°ect long-term demographic and institutional changes, I consider
di®erent ways of time de-trending, including no de-trending, for hours worked. The table shows that the
average hours worked of young households are more positively correlated with linearly de-trended real house
prices than those of old households are, regardless of the type of de-trending for hours worked.
2.2.2 Positive response of the real house price growth rate to over-optimism of young house-
holds compared to old households
Next, I examine the responses of house prices to the di®erences in expectations between young and old
households. For a proxy to household expectations, I construct an index of household expectations of future
economic conditions from a subset of the survey data from the Conference Board of Canada that are used
for constructing the Index of Consumer Con¯dence. More speci¯cally, there are two questions about future
economic conditions among the four overall survey questions:
² considering everything, do you think that your family will be better o®, the same or worse o®
¯nancially six months from now?
² how do you feel the job situation and overall employment will be in this community six months
from now?
Following the methodology for constructing the Index of Consumer Con¯dence, I derive an index of household
7expectations by adding the percentage of positive responses and subtracting the percentage of negative
responses for each question. Thus, higher values of the index indicate more optimistic views of households.
I measure the over-optimism of young households compared to old households by the di®erence of the index
for young households (less than 45 years old) from the index for old households (45 years old and over), and
regress the real house price growth rate on this di®erence as well as lagged dependent variables, the average
index of household expectations for all ages, the real GDP growth rate and the real interest rate. I estimate
the coe±cients by OLS, assuming that unobserved house price shocks are orthogonal to the di®erence in the
index of household expectations. Due to availability of the survey data for age groups, the sample period is
for 1990:4-2007:1.
Table 2 shows the regression results. There are three regressions with di®erent sets of regressors. In each
regression, the lag-2 di®erence of the index of household expectations for the young from the old shows a
statistically signi¯cant positive e®ect on the real house price growth rate. Even though the contemporaneous
di®erence in the index has negative coe±cients in Regressions 1 and 2, the coe±cient becomes insigni¯cant
when I consider the full set of regressors, adding the average index of household expectations for all ages.
Note that the household expectation survey data for age groups in Canada are available only for the
recent period, so that the sample period for the regressions has to be short. Also the horizon of the questions
is 6 month, which is short, too. These properties of the regressions may a®ect the regression results. To
circumvent these problems, I look at U.S. data in addition. In U.S., the University of Michigan Surveys of
Consumers provide the Index of Consumer Expectations for age groups for a longer sample period from 1978.
The horizons of the questions that the Index is based on are 1 and 5 years, depending on each question.
Figure 5 compares the real house price growth rate and the di®erence of the Index of Consumer Expectations
for young households (less than 45 years old) from that for old households (45 years old or more) in U.S. The
¯gure shows that the two series have co-moved very closely, especially before the mid 1990s. Tomura (2009)
reports that in fact the contemporaneous di®erence in the Index of Consumer Expectations between the
young and the old has robustly signi¯cant positive e®ects on the real house price growth rate in regressions
similar to those considered in Table 2.
83 Model
This paper explains the stylized macroeconomic dynamics around house-price peaks documented above,
using a small open economy model featuring Canada. The model includes two types of households who
take and provide mortgage loans, as well as collateral constraints on residential mortgages as in Iacoviello
(2005). I introduce public signals of future economic conditions, allowing the two types of households to
disagree on the accuracy of public signals, which generates heterogeneous expectations. The model also
incorporates monopolistic ¯rms producing intermediate inputs, a representative ¯rm producing ¯nal goods,
and a monetary authority.
3.1 Production
Final good production. There is a representative ¯rm that acts in a perfectly competitive market and

























for i = D;M: (2)
Domestic inputs are denoted by D, and imported inputs are denoted by M. The parameter ! > 0 denotes
the share for imported inputs in the production of ¯nal goods, and µ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between di®erent intermediate inputs.







































Final goods can be consumed, invested into capital stock or exported abroad.
Intermediate inputs. There is a continuum of ¯rms indexed by j 2 [0;1] that monopolistically produce




where kt(j) is the amount of capital stock, lt(j) is units of labour and ® 2 (0;1) is the constant share of capital
in production. At denotes labour augmenting technology. The monopolistic ¯rms can only infrequently
adjust the prices of their products with probability 1 ¡Â every period. When adjusting the price, each ¯rm














subject to the demand function (3). E0
t and ¤t;s are the subjective conditional expectation operator for
¯rms and the ¯rms' discount factor between periods t and s, respectively. The expectation operator and
the discount factor are identical to those of the share holders of ¯rms that will be described below. Firms'



















which is the marginal cost of production for domestic inputs implied by competitive factor markets and the
production function (7).
Each variety of imported inputs is supplied to the domestic market by a monopolistic importing ¯rm.
Importers buy homogeneous foreign goods at a unit cost of etP¤
t for a given nominal exchange rate, et, and
foreign price level, P¤
t . Thus the real exchange rate, st, becomes the real acquisition price of imported goods.
Importers produce each variety of imported intermediate inputs, yM;t(j), from homogeneous foreign goods
via one-to-one transformation. Each monopolistic importer sets the price PM;t(j) of each variety of imported
inputs. As in the domestic intermediate inputs sector, each importer faces a constant probability 1 ¡ Â of

















subject to the demand function (3).
3.2 Households
I consider two types of households that di®er in terms of the subjective discount factor: one type of household
has a higher time-discount rate than the other. Following Iacoviello (2005), I characterize the former type
as `patient', and the latter type as `impatient'. The two types of households are of mass ¹ 2 (0;1) and 1¡¹,
respectively. As described below, the heterogeneity in time discount rates implies that patient households
provide mortgage loans to impatient households in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state. I
also assume collateral constraints on residential mortgages. As home-buyers who take mortgage loans tend
to be young and savers who provide mortgage loans tend to be old, patient and impatient households can be
interpreted as reduced-form representations of young and old households, respectively. See Meh and Terajima
(2008) for detailed analysis of wealth distribution among Canadian households. Given this interpretation,
I allow the elasticity of labour supply of impatient households to di®er from that of patient households.
11This assumption is consistent with the empirical observation that the volatility of labour supply is higher
for younger households. Overall, the model incorporates two types of households who are heterogeneous in
three dimensions: borrowing and lending behaviour, the elasticity of labour supply, and expectations.
Patient Households. Each patient household, denoted by (0), derives utility from consumption, c0
t, and
housing services provided by the housing stock, h0
t; and disutility from supplying labour, l0
t. This is speci¯ed


















t is the subjective conditional expectation operator for patient households, ¯0 is the time-discount

























t is investment in capital stock, k0




change in housing stock, b0
F;t is foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency, b0
D;t is the supply of mortgage
loans to impatient households, qt is the real price of housing stock, st is the real exchange rate, rF;t is the
gross real world interest rate, wt is the real wage, rk;t is the real rental price of capital stock, Rt is the gross
nominal interest rate, ¼t is the gross domestic in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, that is, Pt=Pt¡1, and ¡t is the
sum of the pro¯ts from the monopolistic domestic-input producers and importers.8 On the left-hand side
of (13), I consider an adjustment cost on foreign bond holdings, (³B=2)(b0
F;t)2; where ³B > 0, which ensures
that dynamics around the steady state are stationary in the equilibrium analysis presented below.9 I also














where ³K > 0. In the equilibrium analysis below, the existence of the capital adjustment cost will explain
co-movement between consumption and investment. On the right-hand side of (13), the nominal interest
8Note that money balance does not appear either in the utility function or in the budget constraint. This is equivalent to
considering a `cashless' economy where real money balance enters the utility function in an additive term every period but the
real and nominal money balances are so in¯nitesimal that they do not a®ect the budget constraint.
9See, e.g., Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003) for further details.
12rate is divided by the expected in°ation rate in the previous period. I assume that domestic bonds are
indexed and guarantee the repayment in real terms. I consider indexed loans, rather than nominal loans, to
focus on a minimal set of nominal rigidities.
Patient households control the domestic-input ¯rms and the importers as share holders. Hence I assume
¤t;s = (¯0s¡tc0
t=c0
s), and that the domestic-input ¯rms, the importers and patient households share the
identical subjective conditional expectation operator, E0
t. These assumptions ensure that the domestic-input
¯rms and the importers behave as if they maximize the utility function of patient households.



































As in Iacoviello (2005), the collateral constraint (17) implies that impatient households can only borrow
up to the collateral value of their housing stock.11 Since impatient households value current consumption
more than patient households, it is possible to show that impatient households borrow up to the limit in
the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state.12 The collateral value of housing is determined by
expectations of lenders, who are patient households in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state,
and the parameter m, representing the maximum loan-to-value ratio for residential mortgages.
10The budget constraint (16) implies that impatient households do not invest in capital. This assumption lets me abstract
me from considering the allocation of capital stock between the two types of households, given the convex investment cost.
11See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for the bargaining environment behind the collateral constraint. I assume that borrowers
can renegotiate debt contracts only before the realization of aggregate shocks in the next period, so that lenders can seize
borrowers' labour income in period t + 1 if their debts exceed the value of the collateral after the realization of shocks.
12See Iacoviello (2005) for the details.
133.3 Monetary policy
I assume that the central bank follows a simple interest-rate rule in the form:
b Rt = ÁR b Rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ÁR)Á¼ \ dCPIt + (1 ¡ ÁR)ÁY \ GDP t + Ãt, (18)
where ÁR is a smoothing-term parameter, Á¼ and ÁY determine the responses of the nominal policy interest
rate to CPI in°ation and real GDP, respectively, and Ãt is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock. The variables
denoted by the hat symbol \b" are the log deviations from the steady state values. Here I assume that the
monetary policy rule does not include the expected value of the future in°ation rate or future output. This
type of monetary policy rule is standard in the literature, and also lets the model abstract from specifying
the formation of subjective expectations of the central bank.
On the right-hand side, GDPt denotes real GDP and dCPIt denotes the CPI in°ation rate. Real GDP
is the value of domestic production, which equals PD;tyD;t=Pt. The CPI in°ation rate is de¯ned as
dCPIt =










(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸
rh;t
rh;SS




where Pt is the nominal price of ¯nal goods, ¸ is the ¯xed weight on the housing-rent components of the
CPI, and rh;t is the real value of the housing-rent components of the CPI. The subscript SS denotes steady
state values. I use the steady-state values for the base-year values of the price indices for housing rent and
¯nal goods.
The housing-rent components of the CPI, rh;t, move only slowly in the data possibly due to rent-ceiling
regulations and the fact that the mortgage interest cost in the CPI is a®ected by long-term mortgage
contracts. Figure 6 shows that despite the steady appreciations in house prices in the 2000s, the in°ation
rate of the housing-rent components of the CPI has been persistently lower than the rate of growth of the
nominal house price index. I take this into account by considering two alternative reduced-form speci¯cations:
b rh;t = ·b qt (20)
14or
b rh;t = ·b ut; (21)
where





In both speci¯cations (20) and (21), · is an exogenous parameter that controls for the elasticity of the
housing-rent components of the CPI. This parameter will be calibrated to Canadian data as described
below. In the speci¯cation (20), it is assumed that the housing-rent components of the CPI co-move with
house prices. In the speci¯cation (21), I consider the user cost of housing for patient households as a proxy
to the housing-rent components of the CPI.13 The strength of the speci¯cation (21) is that ut is closer to
the concept of rent than qt. The weakness is that it is di±cult to estimate household expectations in order
to construct the user cost of housing and calibrate the value of ·. In this regard, the speci¯cation (20) is
more straight-forward and convenient. In the equilibrium analysis below, I ¯nd that the main results of the
model do not depend on the housing-rent speci¯cation adopted in the analysis.
3.4 Market-clearing conditions
In each period, the following market clearing conditions are satis¯ed for labour, capital stock, housing stock
and mortgage loans, respectively:
¹l0











t + (1 ¡ ¹)h00
t = 1 (25)
¹b0
t + (1 ¡ ¹)b00
t = 0; (26)
13If I consider the user cost of housing for impatient households, then ut declines in the peak of the housing boom due to
strong expectations of house-price appreciations by impatient households. I avoid this by considering the user cost of housing
for patient households.
15I assume a ¯xed supply of housing stock (i.e. land) normalized to 1. Note that lt(j) and kt(j) are the labour
and the capital demand, respectively, by the domestic-input ¯rm of the variety j. The second equation implies
that the capital stock available for production in the current period must be formed in the previous period.
Factor demand, fkt(j);lt(j)gj2[0;1], is determined by the ¯rst-order conditions implied by cost minimization






(1 ¡ ®)ft yt(j)
wt
: (28)
3.5 Balance of payment
The trade balance must equal the economy-wide net saving, so that







In order to close the model, the export demand must be speci¯ed. I assume the following simple reduced-form
function:
yX;t = (st)¿YF;t; (30)
where ¿ > 0 is the elasticity of the home country's aggregate exports and YF;t is an export demand shock
that summarizes business conditions in the rest of the world. As a rise in st implies depreciation, the positive
value of ¿ ensures that export demand rises as the home currency depreciates.
3.6 Shock processes, public signals and heterogeneous expectations
I assume that labour augmenting technology, At, the world interest rate, rF;t, the export demand shock, YF;t,
and the monetary policy shock, Ãt, follow AR(1) processes. I denote the deterministic steady-state values of
rF;t and YF;t by rF and YF, respectively. Each shock process for xt 2 fln(At); ln(rF;t=rF); ln(YF;t=YF); Ãtg
is de¯ned by
xt = ½xxt¡1 + "x;t; "x;t v i.i.d. N(0;¾2
"x); 0 < ½x < 1; (31)
16where ½x is an autoregressive coe±cient vector and "x;t is an uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation
with zero mean and standard deviation ¾"x.
Households receive a public signal sx;t of a future shock "x;t+n for each xt: The signal of each shock is
generated by the following process:
sx;t = "x;t+n + !x;t; (32)
where !x;t is an uncorrelated and normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviation
º2
x.
I assume that each type of household holds a time-invariant belief on the value of ºx, regardless of

















Thus, public signals generate heterogeneous expectations of future economic conditions between households.
This assumption of time-invariant heterogeneous beliefs is motivated by a vast strand of the behavioural
¯nance literature that analyzes the joint behaviour of stock prices and trading volume in the stock market.
See Hong and Stein (2007) for a survey.
3.7 Equilibrium conditions






s=t solves the maximization





s=t solves the maximization problem for impatient households,
and Pi;t(j) for i = D;M and j 2 [0;1] solves the maximization problem for the domestic-input ¯rm or the
importer if the price can be adjusted in period t. Otherwise, Pi;t(j) equals Pi;t¡1(j). fwt; rK;t; qt; ft; yt;
Pt; Rt; ¡tg is determined to satisfy the market clearing conditions (23)-(26) and the balance of payment
(29) with the de¯nition of each variable speci¯ed above. Households hold rational expectations of the
14As described above, the domestic-input ¯rms and the importers share the same beliefs with patient households.
17determination of fws; rK;s; qs; fs; ys; Ps; Rs; ¡sg1
s=t conditional on each realization of shocks and public
signals. However, households form the subjective likelihood of the realization of future shocks on the basis
of their time-invariant beliefs on the accuracy of public signals.
4 Solution method and parameter speci¯cation
In the following analysis, I will consider di®erent sets of values of (º
0
x;º00
x) for each shock xt, seeking the
speci¯cation that replicates the stylized pattern of housing-market boom-bust cycles described in Section 2.
I solve equilibrium dynamics by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions described above around the
deterministic steady state. I derive the solution to the log-linearized equilibrium conditions by the undeter-
mined coe±cient method. See Tomura (2009) for more details on the solution method.
I calibrate the model parameters to Canadian data. See data appendix for data source details. The
unit of time in the model is a quarter. Table 3 shows the baseline parameter values. The capital share of
income, ®, is calculated from the standard method as described in data appendix. Since housing services
are separated from the other value-added components in the model, ® equals 0.26, which is smaller than the
standard value used in the literature. The depreciation rate, ±, is 0.025, which is the average depreciation
rate of non-residential capital stock. The import share of ¯nal good production, !, is 0.3, which equals the
share of the nominal value of imports in ¯nal domestic demand. Following the description of the Canadian
mortgage market by Christensen, et al. (2008), the loan-to-value ratio for residential mortgages, m, is set
to 0.75. The probability of price-adjustment, Â, is 0.5. This value is in accordance with Amirault, Kwan
and Wilkinson (2004), who report that half of the Canadian ¯rms changed their prices at least once every
quarter during their survey period.
For the construction of the CPI, the weight on the housing-rent components, ¸, is 0.218, which is taken
from the Canadian CPI. In the baseline calibration, we adopt the speci¯cation (20) for determining the
housing-rent components of the CPI. The parameter that controls for the elasticity of the housing-rent
components of the CPI, ·, is 0.292, which is the correlation between the log-di®erence of the weighted sum
18of the housing-rent components of the CPI and the log-di®erence of the house price index.
For the following parameters, I adopt standard values used in the literature. The lead of public signals, n,
is assumed to be 4 periods, which is standard in the news shock literature. As in Iacoviello (2005), the time
discount rates of patient households (¯0) and impatient households (¯00) equal 0.99 and 0.95, respectively.
The fraction of credit-constrained households, 1¡¹, is 0.2, which is the lower-bound of the estimate reported
by Benito and Mumtaz (2006) for UK data. This value is a conservative assumption, since it is lower than
the labour income share for credit-constrained households estimated by Christensen, et al. (2008) using
Canadian data.15 The cost of access to international credit markets, ³B, is assumed to be 1e ¡ 06. The
only purpose of imposing this cost is to make the equilibrium dynamics stationary around the deterministic
steady state. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of inputs, µ, is 6, which implies a mark-up rate
between 15 and 20 percent. The elasticity of export demand to the real exchange rate, ¿, is 0.8. For these
values of µ and ¿, I follow Dib (2008), which estimates a small open economy model using Canadian data.
Also for the monetary policy rule parameters, that is, ÁR, Á¼ and ÁY ; I use the estimates reported by Dib
(2008).16
I separately estimate the AR(1) coe±cient of the shock process for labour augmenting technology, At;
by OLS and those for the real world interest rate, rF;t; by ML. I take the standard errors of the estimations
for the values of ¾"A and ¾"rF . In the regression, labour augmenting technology is log-linearly de-trended.
For the real world interest rate, I use the U.S ex-post real 90-day treasury bill rate. I allow for structural
breaks in the mean level of the interest rate (i.e. the constant term in the regression) and jointly estimate
the structural breaks and the AR(1) coe±cient using the method developed by Bai and Perron (1998).17
The monetary policy shock is assumed to be i.i.d., so that ½Ã is 0. I adopt the standard deviation of the
15Christensen, et al. (2008) estimate an open economy version of the model presented in Iacoviello (2005), using Canadian
data.
16Even though I have separately estimated the monetary policy rule with Canadian data, the estimation result implies that
Á¼ is almost zero. As this is not consistent with the in°ation-targeting behaviour of the Bank of Canada, I use the estimates
of Dib (2008).
17Garcia and Perron (1996) and Rapach and Wohar (2005) empirically identify structural breaks in the mean of the U.S
ex-post real interest rates. I use the GAUSS code provided by Bai and Perron (2003) for the estimation in this paper.
19monetary policy shock, ¾Ã; estimated by Dib (2008).
The deterministic steady-state value of the real world interest rate, rF; equals 1=¯0 so that trade is
balanced at the steady state. The deterministic steady-state value of the export demand shock, YF; is set to
the level where the real price indices of domestic and imported inputs at the steady state are equal to each
other, i.e. PD=P = PM=P.18
Given the parameter values described above, the value of ° is calibrated to match the ratio of the
nominal aggregate housing value to quarterly nominal GDP at the steady state.19 The values of ³K, »0, »00,
½YF and ¾YF are chosen to minimize the sum of mean squared percent di®erences of the following second
moments between the model and data: the standard deviations of average hours worked for young and old
households; the standard deviation of total hours worked for all the households; the standard deviation of
the CPI in°ation rate; and the standard deviation and the lag-1 autocorrelation of de-trended real GDP.
All the standard deviations except for de-trended GDP are divided by the standard deviation of de-trended
GDP. I choose these moments as the target since »0 and »00 determine elasticities of labour supply, and
³K, ½YF and ¾YF a®ect the persistence and the volatility of business °uctuations and the in°ation rate.20
Table 4 compares the second moments delivered by the model with those in the data. Since housing-market
boom-bust cycles are infrequent events, I use the model without public signals when calculating the second
moments of the model.
18This is ensured by setting the real exchange rate, st; equal to the marginal cost of production, ft; at the steady state. The
value of YF is a residual used to adjust the value of exports to satisfy the balanced trade.
19Precisely speaking, the values of °, ³K, »0, »00, ½YF and ¾YF jointly replicate the ¯rst and second moments listed in this
paragraph. Given a value of °, the ratio of aggregate housing value to quarterly GDP varies only slightly with the rest of four
parameter values.
20I ¯nd the volatility of private business investment is not responsive to ³K. I choose the volatility of the in°ation rate
instead in order to replicate the nominal feature of the data.
205 Dynamics with heterogeneous beliefs on the accuracy of public
signals: Technological Shocks
In what follows, I analyze the dynamics of the model in response to public signals when borrowers and
lenders hold heterogeneous beliefs. I ¯rst show the equilibrium dynamics in response to a public signal of
future technological progress, that is, an increase in At+n. The ¯ndings suggest that the stylized pattern of
housing-market boom-bust cycles emerges if impatient households expect that future house prices will rise
and this expectation is neither shared by patient households nor realized ex-post. I will describe the e®ects
of the other types of signals in section 7.
5.1 Response to realized technological progress
Figure 7 shows the e®ects of a positive shock to current technology, At; in period 0. In this case, patient
households increase their savings to consume part of the increased income in the future. This lowers the real
interest rate, reducing the ¯nancing cost of housing investments. This development generates an appreciation
in house prices. Thus, a public signal of a positive future technological shock implies that future house prices
will rise.
5.2 Dynamics when only credit-constrained households expect future techno-
logical progress
I suppose that in period 0, agents receive a public signal of technological progress that will occur in 4 periods.
The signal turns out to be wrong ex-post (i.e. sA;0 > 0 and ²A;4 = 0). I consider the case in which impatient
households believe the public signal to be true (i.e. v00
A = 0). In contrast, patient households do not believe
the public signal to be true and expect no future technological progress (i.e. v
0
A = 1).
Figure 8 shows equilibrium dynamics. The dynamics replicate the stylized pattern of housing-market
boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries: real GDP, consumption, investment, hours worked and house
prices co-move; and the nominal policy interest rate and the CPI in°ation rate fall during housing booms
21and rise as the house price falls.
The collateral constraints on residential mortgages play an important role in generating this pattern.
When impatient households expect that future house prices will rise, they increase housing investments,
which causes a housing boom. Since impatient households are credit-constrained, they work more to ¯nance
their housing investments during the boom.21 At the same time, when patient households do not share the
optimistic expectations of impatient households, they instead expect the boom to be temporary and increase
savings for a future recession. The increases in labour supply and savings reduce real wages and the real
interest rate, respectively.22 Given sticky prices, a resulting fall in the marginal cost of production lowers
the in°ation rate, and, in response to this, the central bank cuts the policy rate.23 When the impatient
households' expectations are not realized in period 4, however, impatient households start dissaving the
over-accumulated housing stock. This weakens housing demand, which causes a housing bust. Impatient
households also reduce labour supply as they no longer have to raise funds for housing investments. At
the same time, patient households withdraw savings to support their consumption. This development raises
real wages and the real interest rate. As a consequence, the in°ation rate rises, inducing a monetary policy
tightening.
Figure 8 shows that patient households reduce their labour supply during the housing boom, but this
is dominated by the increase in labour supply from impatient households. This is because the parameter
speci¯cation implies that impatient households have higher elasticity of labour supply. This parameter
speci¯cation is due to the fact that young households show higher volatility of labour supply than old
households and the interpretation that impatient households are mortgage borrowers, who tend to be young,
while patient households are owners of ¯nancial assets, who tend to be old.
21This e®ect is analyzed by Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) using a similar model with heterogeneous elasticities of labour
supply between the patient and the impatient households.
22In the data, real wages can rise during a housing boom if the housing boom is accompanied by realized technological
progress. The experiment described here shows that the e®ect of heterogeneous expectations on real wages is negative.
23This relationship between the real marginal cost of production and the in°ation rate can be shown by the new-Keynesian
phillips curves implied by the Calvo-pricing.
22Quantitatively, the amplitude of the boom-bust cycles depends on the magnitude of heterogeneity in
household beliefs. Keeping v
0
A = 1, so that patient households do not believe public signals, the amplitude
of the boom-bust cycles is proportional to E00["A;t+njsA;t] in the log-linearized model. As shown by Equation
(34), the conditional expectation is proportional to the value of the signal, sA;t, and a fraction that contains
the noise-to-signal ratio, (1 + v
00
A=¾A)¡1.
5.3 Dynamics with homogeneous expectations
In order to understand the role of heterogeneous expectations between patient and impatient households, I
now consider the case of homogeneous expectations, which is standard in the news-shock literature. In par-






Figure 9 shows that boom-bust cycles are generated in both the goods and the housing markets, but
the nominal interest rate rises during the housing boom. The increase in the nominal interest rate is linked
to expectations of higher future income that subdue the need for savings by patient households. This
increases the real interest rate, which raises the rental price of capital and thus increases the marginal cost of
production.24 Expectations of higher future income also reduce labour supply since households can ¯nance
current consumption by the spared savings. The resulting rise in the real wage adds to the increase in the
marginal cost of production. As a consequence, the price-setting behaviour of domestic-input ¯rms generates
in°ation, which induces the central bank to raise the nominal policy rate during the housing boom.




A) = (1;0)), the equi-
librium dynamics are similar to those reported here. Thus, the co-existence of optimistic credit-constrained
mortgage borrowers, represented by impatient households, and pessimistic savers, represented by patient
households, is necessary to explain the stylized pattern of housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized
24In Figure 9, the rental price of capital rises despite the increase in investment in capital. This is because the real price of
domestic inputs rises, which increases the returns on domestic production. On the °ip side of the coin, the real price of imported
inputs from the importers fall and an increase in the imported inputs in the ¯nal good production raises the productivity of
capital stock embodied in domestic inputs for the ¯nal good production.
23countries described in Section 2.
6 Policy experiments and sensitivity analysis
In this section, I focus on the cases in which households receive a public signal of technological progress that





(0;1)) and the signal is not realized ex-post (i.e. sA;0 > 0 and ²A;4 = 0).
6.1 More weight on in°ation in the monetary policy rule
Figure 10 compares the model's dynamics under the estimated monetary policy rule and a weaker anti-
in°ationary weight in the monetary policy rule (Á¼ = 1:03). The ¯gure indicates that stronger policy
responses to in°ation amplify the boom-bust cycles. The intuition is that with a higher value of Á¼, the
central bank cuts the policy rate more in response to the fall in the in°ation rate during housing booms, and
raises the policy rate more in response to the rise in the in°ation rate when the house price falls.
6.2 E®ect of higher loan-to-value ratios
Figure 11 compares the boom-bust cycles under di®erent loan-to-value ratios for residential mortgages: high
(0.9), benchmark (0.75) and low (0.5). The ¯gure indicates that the amplitude of the boom-bust cycles
signi¯cantly depends on the loan-to-value ratio. The impatient households' housing demand illustrates the

























The left-hand side of the equation is the marginal utility derived from housing services and the right-hand side
is the e®ective user cost of housing for impatient households. Roughly speaking, the user cost is determined
by a weighted average of the present discounted values of housing for lenders and borrowers. As the loan-to-
value ratio, m; increases, the user cost of housing is more sensitive to the patient household's evaluation of
24future housing value, represented by the second term on the right-hand side.25 This contributes to reducing
the user cost of housing one period before the realization of the signal (i.e. period 3) when lenders' pessimistic
expectations induce them to increase savings and the real interest rate declines. Thus, higher loan-to-value
ratios make housing investments cheaper for impatient households in period 3. This enhances the housing
boom in period 3, which feeds back into house prices in periods 0-2. Hence, higher loan-to-value ratios
increase the amplitude of housing-market boom-bust cycles.
Our results contribute to the literature on housing dynamics and business cycle. Kiyotaki, Michaelides
and Nikolov (2007) document that the loan-to-value ratio does not signi¯cantly alter the dynamics of housing
prices in their model. This result also holds in Iacoviello (2005). I show that with the presence of hetero-
geneous beliefs, the loan-to-value ratio plays an important role in determining the magnitude of boom-bust
cycles in house prices.
6.3 Higher elasticity of the housing-rent components of the CPI
To generate the response of the housing-rent components of the CPI, I have so far used the speci¯cation
(20). I ¯nd that the results reported above do not change even when I adopt an alternative speci¯cation
as in (21). In the latter case, the value of · is calibrated to 0.118, which is the correlation between the
log-di®erence of the weighted sum of the housing-rent components of the CPI and the log-di®erence of the
ex-post user cost of housing in Canadian data.26
For sensitivity analysis, I also consider a higher value of ·, 0.4, with the speci¯cation (21). In this
case, the housing-rent components of the CPI respond to the housing boom more strongly. Figure 12 shows
that, in the early periods of the housing boom, the CPI in°ation rate and the nominal policy interest rate
decline. In the subsequent periods of the boom, as house-price appreciation accelerates, the in°ation rate
25To see this, replace mE00
t qt+1 with mqt+1 on the right-hand side. This operation is valid at the ¯rst-order approximation.
After the replacement, the last term of the right-hand side would have (1 ¡ m) as one of its factors.
26For some periods, the ex-post user cost of housing takes negative values due to very strong house-price appreciations, for
which the log of the user cost is not well-de¯ned. I exclude these periods from the sample when I take the correlation. With the
new value of ·, all the parameters are re-calibrated. But the re-calibration does not change the parameter values signi¯cantly.
25of the housing-rent components of the CPI strongly rises. This results in an acceleration in CPI in°ation
towards the peak of the housing boom, which induces a gradual rise in the nominal policy interest rate.
This dynamics of CPI in°ation is consistent with the median pattern around the peaks of the past housing
market booms reported in Figure 1, which shows that the total CPI in°ation rate has tended to start rising
before the peaks of housing booms.
Also, note that the di®erence between the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼, and the total CPI in°ation rate
in the model is consistent with Figure 3, which shows that the in°ation rate of the CPI excluding shelter
costs fell during the housing boom in the late 1980s, while the in°ation rate of the total CPI including shelter
costs did not.
If I set very high values of ·, then the CPI in°ation rate rises with house prices. This induces a counter-
factual co-movement between house prices and the nominal interest rate. Thus, in order to explain the
stylized behaviour of the nominal policy interest rate reported in Figure 1, it is important to take into
account some degree of stickiness in the housing-rent components of the CPI.
7 Boom-bust cycles in response to other shocks
So far I have been focusing on a public signal of future technological progress as the source of boom-bust
cycles in the housing market. In the model, there are three other types of shocks: monetary policy, real
world interest rate and export demand shocks. I ¯nd that public signals of a future expansionary monetary
policy shock and a future decline in the real world interest rate generate boom-bust cycles in the housing
market, when only the impatient households believe the signals to be true and the shocks are not realized
ex-post. The key feature of these signals is that they imply future appreciations in housing values. See
Figures 13 and 14 for the boom-bust cycles that emerge from signals of future monetary policy and the real
world interest rate.
On the contrary, I ¯nd that a signal of a future positive export-demand shock generates a recession-boom
cycle. To understand this result, I start from describing the dynamics in response to a realized positive
26export-demand shock. Figure 15 shows that the real interest rate rises and the house price drops. These
movements are generated by the dynamics of the real exchange rate, which immediately appreciates in
response to the positive export-demand shock and then gradually depreciates returning to the steady state
level. Given the ¯xed real world interest rate, the gradual depreciation of the home currency raises the
domestic real interest rate through the uncovered interest-rate parity, which lowers house prices. Thus, a
signal of a future positive export-demand shock generates expectations of future depreciations in housing
values. This lowers current house prices in response to the signal. Figure 16 shows the model's dynamics in
response to a signal of a future positive export-demand shock.
8 Conclusion
The model in this paper implies that the co-existence of optimistic credit-constraint borrowers and pessimistic
savers, who respectively take and provide mortgage loans, generate expectation-driven boom-bust cycles in
house prices, output, consumption, investment and hours worked in response to ex-post wrong public signals
of favourable future fundamentals. These ¯ndings contribute to the news-shock literature, showing an
alternative set-up that generates expectation-driven boom-bust cycles in a business cycle model.
Moreover, the nominal policy interest rate falls during booms and rises during busts, and the rise in
the policy rate is accompanied by an increase in the in°ation rate in the model. These equilibrium dy-
namics replicate the stylized features of housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries. Policy
experiments demonstrate that greater anti-in°ationary weight in the monetary policy rule ampli¯es °uctua-
tions in the nominal policy interest rate during housing-market boom-bust cycles, which destabilizes house
prices and thus aggregate economic activity. This result contributes to the policy debate on the conduct
of monetary policy during asset-market booms. This paper also documents that higher loan-to-value ratios
amplify housing-market boom-bust cycles by allowing for higher leverage in housing investments. This result
contrasts with the previous literature on credit constraints on households and house-price dynamics, which
¯nds that the loan-to-value ratio does not signi¯cantly alter the dynamics of housing prices in the models.
27A Data appendix
A.1 Stylized pattern of housing-market boom-bust cycles
I follow the data appendix of Ahearne, et al. (2005). See their paper for the de¯nition of the house-price
peaks in each industrialized country. Real GDP growth rates come from the OECD database. The series
are based on seasonally adjusted real GDP. The rates are annualized quarterly growth rates. For Germany,
uni¯ed German data is used whenever possible. If not available, West German data is used. This is the
same for the following data.
Total CPI in°ation comes from the OECD database. These series give year-to-quarter increases in the
price index as a percentage. The CPI excluding shelter costs for Canada (V41691234 from the Statistics
Canada) is only available from 1984:4Q.
Nominal policy interest rates are short-term interest rates, which are 3-month nominal money-market
rates, taken from the OECD database. These rates are normally highly correlated with the target rate
adopted by the central bank. If short-term interest rates are not available from the OECD database, I use
the money market rates from the IMF database. For a given peak, I always use a single source per country. I
do this by counting the number of observations available from each source for that country around that peak
and choosing the source to maximize this count. All short-term rates are expressed in percentage points on
an annualized basis.
Hours worked are calculated as the product of two series from the OECD database: the total number of
workers in the economy and the hours per employee. The growth rate is expressed in percentage points on
a year-to-quarter basis. Belgium, Denmark, Spain, and Switzerland do not have data available at quarterly
frequency. For these countries, I compute year-over-year growth rates, then interpolate quarterly values by
estimating a cubic spine, using the year-over-year results as year-end values.
28A.2 Figure 5
The ¯gure shows U.S. data. The real house price growth rate is the ¯rst-order log di®erence of the nationwide
house price index from the OFHEO divided by the GDP de°ator. The Index of Consumer Expectations for
young households are the average of the index for 18-34 years old (ice a1834) and that for 35-44 years old
(ice a3544) in the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers weighted by the numbers of householders in
corresponding age groups from Table HH-3, the March CPS, U.S. Census Bureau. The Index of Consumer
Expectations for old households are similarly constructed from ice a4554, ice a4564 and ice a6597. \Di®er-
ence between young and old" in the ¯gure is the di®erence of the index for young households from the index
for old households. The number of householders in each age group is only annually published. This series is
converted into a quarterly series by linear interpolation.
A.3 Calibration
Table 5 shows data source details. Data sources are listed in alphabetical indices in the ¯rst column of the
table. The share of capital in the production of home goods, ®, is calculated by the average of (1-(c)/(GDP-
(b)-(d)-(e))) over 1961:1Q-2007:1Q. GDP is the nominal value of GDP contained in (a). The share for import
goods in ¯nal domestic demand, °; is the average of ((f)/(C+I+G)) over 1961:1Q-2007:1Q. C+I+G is the
sum of the nominal values of consumption, investment and government expenditure contained in (a). The
depreciation rates, ±; is the sample average of (V4419837)/(V4419841) over 1943-2006. As (V4419841) is the
end-year value of capital stock, the denominator is lagged by a year.
I estimate labour augmenting technology using the Solow residuals. We construct a chained-dollar index
of GDP excluding rents from the nominal values of the demand-side components of GDP contained in (a) and
the Table 380-0009 (the components of private consumption expenditure), and the corresponding de°ators.
Quarterly data of hours worked (V4391505) is only available from 1976:1Q, so I extend it for 1961-1976 by
the annual data of hours worked (V716818). I apply linear interpolation to the annual data in order to obtain
quarterly data. The amount of capital stock is calculated by dividing (h) by the de°ator for non-residential
29investment contained in (i). Since (h) is annual data, I interpolate (h) by the quarterly accumulation of new
capital stock implied by the chained-dollar real values of non-residential investment contained in (a). I apply
the value of ® for the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production function.
The weight on the housing-rent components of the CPI, ¸, is 0.218, which is taken from the 2005
basket for the Canadian CPI. The weights for this basket are provided by the Statistics Canada (http:
//www.statcan.ca/english/sdds/document/2301_D34_T9_V1_B.pdf). The housing-rent components of
the CPI are Rented accommodation (V41691051) and Owned accommodation (V41691055). The nominal
house-price index is the Royal LePage House Price Index, which covers the prices of both new and existing
houses. See Tomura (2008) for more details on the construction of the nominal house-price index. For the
baseline calibration, the parameter that controls for the elasticity of the housing-rent components of the CPI,
·, is the correlation between the log-di®erence of the weighted sum of the housing-rent components of the
CPI and the log-di®erence of the nominal house-price index for 1975:2Q-2007:1Q. It is convenient to use the
correlation between the nominal variables for a proxy to the value of ·, since it does not require a CPI series
that excludes the housing-rent components for the long sample period for denominating nominal variables.
The correlation between the log-di®erences of the real housing-rent components and the real house-price
index denominated by the total CPI shows similar values of ·, ranging from 0.1 to 0.4, depending on the
choice of the sample period. When I calibrate · for the speci¯cation (21), I construct the ex-post nominal
user cost of housing, ut, from the Royal LePage House Price Index and the average nominal interest rate for
5-year mortgage loans in Canada. Then I calculate the correlation between the log-di®erence of the weighted
sum of the housing-rent components of the CPI and the log-di®erence of the ex-post nominal user cost of
housing for 1975:2Q-2006:4Q.
The ratio of nominal aggregate housing value to quarterly GDP is 1.47, which is the average of ((k)+(l))/GDP
over 1961:1Q-2006:4Q. GDP in the denominator of these ratios excludes the values of imputed and paid rents
(b). The data (k) and (l) are taken from the wealth account of persons and unincorporated business in the
National Account.
For the second moments in Table 4, seasonally-adjusted chained-dollar real GDP in (a) and aggregate
30hours worked (V4391505) for 1980:1Q-2007:1Q are log-linearly de-trended. The average hours worked of
young households in the table is calculated from the actual hours worked of households with age between
25 and 44 years old (V3494776) divided by the population of these ages. The actual hours worked are
seasonally-adjusted by the X12 command in RATS. I normalize the actual hours worked by the population,
since »0 and »00 determine elasticities of labour supply at each household level. The quarterly population
estimate in the denominator is constructed by multiplying the quarterly total population (V1) with the
annual share for the age group in the population of all the age groups ((V466680)/(V466965 + V466980 +
V466680 + V466683 + V466686)). The average hours worked of old households is similarly calculated from
the data for the age group over 45 years old. I divide the young by the old { i.e. above 45 years old{ as there
is no more age groups categories in data. The sample period for hours worked data for each age group is
for 1976:1Q-2007:1Q. When calculating the standard deviations, the log of the average hours worked series
for each household type are de-trended by the time dummy and the time-squared dummy. I include the
time-squared dummy here as the average hours-worked series for old households show a U-shape. I take this
long-run trend as driven by some institutional changes that are not considered in my model. Similarly, I
identify structural breaks in the time-varying mean of the log of the CPI in°ation rate by the Bai and Perron
(1998) method, and calculate the standard deviation using the deviation of the log of the CPI in°ation rate
from the time-varying mean. For the structural break estimation, I use the code provided by Bai and Perron
(2003).
31References
[1] Ahearne, A.G., J. Ammer, B.M. Doyle, L.S. Kole and R.F. Martin. 2005. \House Prices and Monetary
Policy: A Cross-Country Study." International Finance Discussion Papers No. 841. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
[2] Amirault, D., C. Kwan, and G. Wilkinson. 2004. \A Survey of the Price-Setting Behaviour of Canadian
Companies." Bank of Canada Review Winter 2004-2005:29-40.
[3] Bai, J. and P. Perron. 1998. \Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural Changes."
Econometrica, 66(1): 47-78.
[4] Bai, J., and P. Perron. 2003. \Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change Models."
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18:1-22.
[5] Basant Roi, M. and R.R. Mendes. 2007. \Should Central Banks Adjust Their Target Horizons in Re-
sponse to House-Price Bubbles?." Bank of Canada Discussion Paper No. 2007-4.
[6] Beaudry, P., and F. Portier. 2004. \An exploration into Pigou's theory of cycles." Journal of Monetary
Economics, 51:1183-1216.
[7] Beaudry, P. and F. Portier. 2007. \When can Changes in Expectations Cause Business Cycle Fluctua-
tions in Neo-classical Settings?." Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1): 458-477.
[8] Benito, A., and H. Mumtaz. 2006. \Consumption Excess Sensitivity, Liquidity Constraints and the
Collateral Role of Housing." Bank of England Working Paper No. 306.
[9] Bernanke B. and M.Gertler. 1999. \Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility". Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City Economic Review, Fourth Quarter 1999:17-51
[10] Bolton, P., Scheinkman, J., Xiong, W. 2006. \Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour
in Speculative Markets." Review of Economic Studies, 73(3):577-610.
[11] Campbell, J.R., and Z. Hercowitz. 2004. \The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic
Stabilization." Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper No. 2004-24.
[12] Cecchetti, S., H. Genberg and S. Wadhwani. 2003. \Asset Prices in a Flexible In°ation Targeting
Framework." In Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, Regulatory and International
Policies, 427-44. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[13] Christiano, L., C. Ilut, R. Motto, and M. Rostagno. 2007. \Monetary Policy and Stock Market Boom-
Bust Cycles." Mimeo. http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~lchrist/research.htm.
32[14] Christensen, I., P. Corrigan, C. Mendicino, and S. Nishiyama. 2008. \Housing Collateral, Residential
Investment and the Canadian Business Cycle." Mimeo. Bank of Canada.
[15] Den Haan, W.J., and G. Kaltenbrunner. 2007. \Anticipated Growth and Business Cycles in Matching
models." CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6063.
[16] Dib, A. 2008. \Welfare E®ects of Commodity Price and Exchange Rate Volatilities in a Multi-Sector
Small Open Economy Model." Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2008-8.
[17] Floden, M., 2007. \Vintage Capital and Expectations Driven Business Cycles." CEPR Discussion Paper
No. 6113.
[18] Garcia, R., and P. Perron. 1996. \An Analysis of the Real Interest Rate Under Regime Shifts." Review
of Economics and Statistics, 78(1):111-125.
[19] Hong, H., and J.C. Stein. 2007. \Disagreement and the Stock Market." Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 21(2):109-128.
[20] Iacoviello, M. 2005. \House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle."
American Economic Review, 95(3):739-64.
[21] Jaimovich, N. and S. Rebelo. ,2006. \Can News about the Future Drive the Business Cycle?", NBER
Working Paper No. 12537.
[22] Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore. 1997. \Credit Cycles." Journal of Political Economy, 105(2):211-248.
[23] Kiyotaki, N., A. Michaelides, and K. Nikolov. 2007. \Winners and Losers in Housing Markets." Mimeo.
http://www.princeton.edu/~kiyotaki/.
[24] Kobayashi, K., T. Nakajima and M. Inaba. 2007. \Collateral Constraint and News-driven Cycles."
Discussion paper No. 07013, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
[25] Mankiw, N.G., R. Reis, J. Wolfers. 2003. \Disagreement about In°ation Expectations." In: Gertler, M.,
Rogo®, K. (Eds.). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003.
[26] Meh, C.A., and Y. Terajima. 2008. \In°ation, Nominal Portfolios, and Wealth Redistribution in
Canada." Bank of Canada Working Paper 2008-19.
[27] Piazzesi, M., and M. Schneider. 2008. \In°ation and the Price of Real Assets." Mimeo. http:
//homepages.nyu.edu/~ms1927/.
[28] Rapach, D.E., and M.E. Wohar. 2005. \Regime Changes in International Real Interest Rates: Are They
a Monetary Phenomenon?" Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 37(5):887-906.
33[29] Schmitt-Groh¶ e, S., and M. Uribe. 2003. \Closing Small Open Economy Models." Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 61:163-185.
[30] Tomura, H. 2008. \A Model of Housing Boom and Bust in a Small Open Economy." Bank of Canada
Working Paper No. 2008-9.
[31] Tomura, H. 2009. \Heterogeneous Beliefs and Housing-Market Boom-Bust Cycles." mimeo. Bank of
Canada.
34Table 1: Correlation coe±cients between the linearly de-trended real house price index and the average hours
worked of di®erent age groups in Canada
Non de-trended Linearly de-trended Quadratically de-trended
hours worked hours worked hours worked
Less than 45 years old 0.371 0.499 0.482
45 years old and over -0.047 -0.055 0.182
45-65 years old 0.057 0.100 0.279
Notes: Each ¯gure in the table is the correlation coe±cient between the real house price index and the average hours worked in
question. The real house price index is the natural log of the Royal LePage House Price Index de°ated by the total CPI, and
the linear time trend is excluded from the log. The average hours worked are the natural log of hours worked per population
per week for each age group. The linear time-trend is excluded in the second column. The quadratic time-trend is excluded in
the third column. The sample period is for 1976:1 to 2007:1.
35Table 2: Regressions of the real house price growth rate on the di®erence in consumer expectations between
young and old households in Canada
Dependent Variable: ¢ ln(Real house price).
Sample period: From 1990:04 To 2007:01.
Regressor Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
EXP(< 45) - EXP(¸ 45) -0.000527¤ (0.000299) -0.000538¤¤ (0.000246) -0.000303 (0.000241)
EXP(< 45) - EXP(¸ 45) (-1) 0.000133 (0.000299) -0.0000144 (0.000252) 0.0000849 (0.000240)
EXP(< 45) - EXP(¸ 45) (-2) 0.000522¤ (0.000299) 0.000614¤¤ (0.000244) 0.000597¤¤ (0.000236)
EXP(< 45) - EXP(¸ 45) (-3) 0.000283 (0.000304) 0.000102 (0.000270) -0.00000616 (0.000259)
Constant -0.00779 (0.0126) 0.00143 (0.0162) -0.00799 (0.0157)
EXP 0.000168 (0.000140)
EXP (-1) 0.000359¤¤ (0.000163)
EXP (-2) -0.000355¤¤ (0.000168)
EXP (-3) -0.0000408 (0.000144)
¢ ln(Real house price) (-1) 0.223¤ (0.131) 0.169 (0.136)
¢ ln(Real house price) (-2) -0.0415 (0.123) 0.0657 (0.134)
¢ ln(Real house price) (-3) 0.0190 (0.122) 0.0679 (0.122)
¢ ln(Real GDP) 1.07¤¤¤ (0.373) 0.821¤¤ (0.378)
¢ ln(Real GDP) (-1) -0.654 (0.472) -0.526 (0.443)
¢ ln(Real GDP) (-2) 0.167 (0.469) 0.140 (0.438)
¢ ln(Real GDP) (-3) 0.0535 (0.401) 0.0333 (0.382)
Real interest rate -0.00407 (0.00318) -0.00212 (0.00302)
Real interest rate (-1) 0.00745¤¤ (0.00316) 0.00916¤¤¤ (0.00303)
Real interest rate (-2) -0.00905¤¤¤ (0.00315) -0.00519 (0.00327)
Real interest rate (-3) -0.00470 (0.00320) -0.00629¤ (0.00330)
R2 0.175 0.636 0.704
Notes: The coe±cients are estimated by OLS. The standard errors are in parentheses beside the coe±cient values. ¤, ¤¤ and
¤¤¤ indicate that the coe±cient in question is signigicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The minus values in
parentheses in the ¯rst column indicate lagged regressors. `EXP (< 45)' is the index of household expectations for less than 45
years old and `EXP (¸ 45)' for 45 years old and over. `EXP' is the index of household expectations for all ages. The real house
price is the Royal LePage House Price Index denominated by the total CPI. The real GDP and the real interest rate are also
denominated by the total CPI. The real interest rate is the ex-post interest rate. ¢ ln(¢) indicates ¯rst-order log di®erence.
36Table 3: Baseline parameter values
(¯0;¯00) = (0:99;0:95) Time discount rates
° = 0:0166 Housing weight in preference
(»0;»00) = (19:4; 1e ¡ 14) Elasticity of labour supply
¹ = 0:8 Patient's fraction of population
® = 0:26 Capital share in production
³K = 19:8 Capital adjustment cost
± = 0:025 Depreciation rate of capital stock
µ = 6 Elasticity of substitution
! = 0:3 Import share in ¯nal domestic demand
m = 0:75 Loan-to-value ratio
Â = 0:5 Probability of price-adjustment
³B = 1e ¡ 06 Access to international credit markets
¿ = 0:8 Elasticity of export demand
¸ = 0:218 Weight on the housing-rent components of CPI
· = 0:292 Elasticity of the housing-rent components of CPI
(ÁR;Á¼;ÁY ) = (0:73; 1:81; 0:05) Monetary policy rule
(½A;½Ã;½rF;½YF) = (0:93; 0; 0:43; 0) AR(1) coe±cients for shocks
(¾"A;¾"Ã;¾"rF ;¾"YF ) = (0:008; 0:0037; 0:011; 0:11) Standard deviations of shocks
37Table 4: Second moments targeted by calibration of the capital adjustment cost (³K), the elasticities of
labour supply (»0;»00), and the moments of export-demand shocks (½YF;¾YF)
a. Standard deviations of the CPI in°ation rate and labour supply (relative to de-trended GDP)
Model Data
CPI in°ation rate 0.14 0.13
Average hours worked for old households (Age¸45) 0.97 0.69
Average hours worked for young households (Age<45) 1.14 1.25
Aggregate hours worked 0.82 0.91
b. Standard deviation and autocorrelation of de-trended GDP
Model Data
Standard deviation 0.05 0.03
Lag-1 autocorrelation 0.94 0.96
38Table 5: Data source table
Data name Data source
(a) Demand components of GDP (Nominal & Chained 2002 $) Table 380-0002
(b) Paid and imputed rents (Nominal) V498532+V498533
(c) Compensation of employees (Nominal) V498076
(d) Indirect taxes (Nominal) V1992216 + V1997473
(e) Proprietors' income (Nominal) V498080 + V498081
(f) Value of import (Nominal) V498106
(g) Depreciation rate of capital stock (Chained 2002 $) V4419837, V4419841
(h) Capital stock (Nominal) V34738+V34739
(i) De°ator for non-residential investment V498097, V1992054
(j) Actual hours worked V4391505, V716818
(k) Value of housing land owned by households V33469
(l) Value of residential structure owned by households V33464
(m) Actual hours worked for households between 25 and 44 years old V3494776
(n) Actual hours worked for households over 45 years old V3494781
(o) Quarterly total population estimate V1
(p) Annual population estimates for age groups V466965,V466980,V466680
V466683, V466686
Note: The data labels and the table name are from Statistics Canada.
39Figure 1: Median dynamics around the peaks of housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries
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Notes: The ¯gure takes the median of the variable in question in each quarter around the peaks of past housing booms in
industrialized countries in North-America, Europe and Asia-Paci¯c since 1970. Total hours worked are the levels constructed
from the medians of hours worked growth rates. Period 0 corresponds to the peaks of housing booms. See data appendix for
more details.
40Figure 2: Macroeconomic indicators around the peaks of housing-market boom-bust cycles in Canada














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Ahearne, et al. (2005) identify the three peaks of housing booms since 1970 in Canada. In each panel, the peak is
indicated by the vertical line. See data appendix for data sources.









































































































CPI inflation CPI inflation exc. shelter cost
Notes: Ahearne, et al. (2005) identify three peaks of housing booms since 1970 in Canada. The third peak is 1989:1Q, which is
indicated by the vertical line. The CPI excluding shelter costs is only available from 1984:4Q. The in°ation rates in the ¯gure
are 4-quarter percentage changes. See data appendix for the data sources.























































































Notes: Labour supply data are from the Statistics Canada. Real house price index is the Royal LePage House Price Index
de°ated by the total CPI.
43Figure 5: Real house price growth rates and di®erences in the Index of Consumer Expectations between











































Difference between young and old: Index of Consumer Expectations (left axis)
Real house price growth rate (right axis)
Notes: Positive values of \Di®erence between young and old" in the ¯gure indicate that young households (44 years old or less)
have stronger expectations for future economic conditions than old households (45 years old or more). See the data appendix
for data sources.











































Notes: The rates in the ¯gure are Quarter-on-quarter changes. The nominal house price index is the Royal LePage House
Price Index. See data appendix for more details.
45Figure 7: Response to a current positive technological shock
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Notes: Figures are log deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF;t, which is a di®erence from the steady-
state value. The shock hits in period 0, i.e. "A;0 = ¾"A, and the economy is at the steady state before the shock. In the
¯rst and second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively. \House Pr." is the house price, qt,
\CPI" is the CPI in°ation rate, dCPIt, \¼ (goods)" is the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼t, \Real FX" is the real exchange
rate, st, and \Mgnl. cost" is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions
of the patient and the impatient households.
46Figure 8: Response to a signal of future technological progress when only the impatient households expect
the progress, but the signal is not ex-post realized
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Notes: Figures are % deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF;t, which is a di®erence from the steady-
state value. The signal is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. sA;0 = ¾"A and "A;4 = 0. The economy is at
the steady state before period 0. Only the impatient households expect the progress, i.e. º0
A = 1 and º00
A = 0. In the ¯rst and
second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively. \House Pr." is the house price, qt, \CPI" is
the CPI in°ation rate, dCPIt, \¼ (goods)" is the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼t, \Real FX" is the real exchange rate, st, and
\Mgnl. cost" is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions of the patient
and the impatient households.
47Figure 9: Response to a signal of future technological progress when all the households expect the progress,
but the signal is not ex-post realized
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Notes: Figures are % deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF;t, which is a di®erence from the steady-
state value. The signal is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. sA;0 = ¾"A and "A;4 = 0. The economy is at
the steady state before period 0. All the households expect the progress, i.e. º0
A = 0 and º00
A = 0. In the ¯rst and second rows,
C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively. \House Pr." is the house price, qt, \CPI" is the CPI
in°ation rate, dCPIt, \¼ (goods)" is the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼t, \Real FX" is the real exchange rate, st, and \Mgnl.
cost" is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions of the patient and the
impatient households.
48Figure 10: E®ect of higher anti-in°ationary weight in the monetary policy rule on housing-market boom-bust
cycles.
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Notes: See the notes of Figure 8 for the set-up. The weight on the in°ation rate in the monetary policy rule Á¼ is 1.81 in the
blue line and 1.03 in the green line.
49Figure 11: E®ect of higher loan-to-value ratios on housing-market boom-bust cycles.
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Notes: See the notes of Figure 8 for the set-up. The loan-to-value ratio m is 0.9 in the blue line, 0.75 in the green line, and 0.5
in the red line.
50Figure 12: E®ect of higher elasticity of the housing-rent components of CPI on housing-market boom-bust
cycles.
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Notes: See the notes of Figure 8 for the set-up. The speci¯cation (21) is adopted for generating the responses of the housing-rent
components of the CPI. · = 0:4.
51Figure 13: Response to a signal of a future expansionary monetary policy shock when only the impatient
households expect the shock, but the signal is not ex-post realized
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Notes: Figures are % deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF;t, which is a di®erence from the steady-
state value. The signal is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. sÃ;0 = ¡¾"Ã and "Ã;4 = 0. The economy is
at the steady state before period 0. Only the impatient households expect the shock, i.e. º0
Ã = 1 and º00
Ã = 0. In the ¯rst and
second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively.\House Pr." is the house price, qt, \CPI" is
the CPI in°ation rate, dCPIt, \¼ (goods)" is the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼t, \Real FX" is the real exchange rate, st, and
\Mgnl. cost" is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions of the patient
and the impatient households.
52Figure 14: Response to a signal of a future decline in the real world interest rate when only the impatient
households expect the decline, but the signal is not ex-post realized
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Notes: Figures are % deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF;t, which is a di®erence from the steady-
state value. The signal is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. srF ;0 = ¡¾"rF and "rF ;4 = 0. The economy
is at the steady state before period 0. Only the impatient households expect the decline, i.e. º0
rF = 1 and º00
rF = 0. In the
¯rst and second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively.\House Pr." is the house price, qt,
\CPI" is the CPI in°ation rate, dCPIt, \¼ (goods)" is the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼t, \Real FX" is the real exchange
rate, st, and \Mgnl. cost" is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions
of the patient and the impatient households.
53Figure 15: Response to a current positive export demand shock
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Notes: Figures are % deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF;t, which is a di®erence from the steady-
state value. The shock hits in period 0, i.e. "YF ;0 = ¾"YF , and the economy is at the steady state before the shock. In the
¯rst and second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively.\House Pr." is the house price, qt,
\CPI" is the CPI in°ation rate, dCPIt, \¼ (goods)" is the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼t, \Real FX" is the real exchange
rate, st, and \Mgnl. cost" is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions
of the patient and the impatient households.
54Figure 16: Response to a signal of a future positive export demand shock when only the impatient households
expect the shock, but the signal is not ex-post realized
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Notes: Figures are % deviations from the deterministic steady-state values except bF;t, which is a di®erence from the steady-
state value. The signal is received in period 0, but is not realized in period 4, i.e. sYF ;0 = ¾"YF and "YF ;4 = 0. The economy
is at the steady state before period 0. Only the impatient households expect the shock, i.e. º0
YF = 1 and º00
YF = 0. In the
¯rst and second rows, C and L are aggregate consumption and labour supply, respectively.\House Pr." is the house price, qt,
\CPI" is the CPI in°ation rate, dCPIt, \¼ (goods)" is the in°ation rate of ¯nal goods, ¼t, \Real FX" is the real exchange
rate, st, and \Mgnl. cost" is the marginal cost of production, ft. The third and the forth rows respectively show the actions
of the patient and the impatient households.
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